The Ignorance of the Supreme Court
Monday, January 25, 2010
In the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Citizens United v. FEC, the Court struck down campaign finance laws that banned corporate political spending on candidates in federal elections. Both the right and left have expressed outrage at the ruling, which, it is believed, will drastically increase the amount of money that corporations, unions and other interest groups spend to support or criticize federal candidates.
But despite all the outrage, one must ask: will the ruling really change anything? Though a great deal of campaign finance reform has taken place in America since the 1940s, the political system remains distorted in favor of elites, who have significantly more leverage than does the average American. Indeed, it could be said that the provision at issue in Citizens United did little to reduce the influence that corporations and special interests have in federal elections.
What we saw with Max Baucus during the health care debate is a perfect example: he received millions of dollars from insurance companies and hospitals to tailor the legislation to their benefit, while ignoring the demands of center-left and progressive Democrats for more radical changes like the public option. Campaign finance reform has done little to change the fundamental flaw in the democratic electoral system: namely, that those with the most money have the loudest voice.
Whatever the effect of the ruling, it's clear that the Court was not interested in addressing the problem; their arguments focused on the supposed “chilling” effect that the McCain-Feingold Act had on a corporation's free exercise of political speech. Their reasoning goes like this: according to the first amendment, the government does not have the authority to restrict speech based on the character of the speaker or the content of their speech; based on a long line of Supreme Court precedents, corporations are entitled to first amendment protection. As such, the Court concluded that McCain-Feingold's restrictions on corporate spending are unconstitutional because they restrict the ability of a certain class—big business—to express their political beliefs.
This is a stock argument against the ban; but read further into the Court's opinion, and you will note an important distinction that considerably weakens their reasoning. The ruling in Citizens United—that the government may not restrict corporate spending during campaigns—applies only to a corporation's independent expenditures on a candidate, not to their direct contributions to that same candidate. Corporations are still forbidden to directly contribute to candidates, but they may spend as much money as they like to promote or criticize said candidate. For instance, Blue Cross and Blue Shield cannot contribute to Harry Reid's opponent; but, after this ruling, they can spend as much as they like on their own ads criticizing Harry Reid and promoting his opponent.
The distinction between direct contributions and independent expenditures is crucial to the Court's argument. The Court admits that direct contributions from interest groups to political candidates fosters corruption, but when these groups make independent expenditures —for instance, a commercial for or against a candidate—there is somehow no threat or appearance of corruption. To quote Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion, “simply because speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that those officials are corrupt.”
Are you kidding me? What is an “independent expenditure” if not an indirect contribution to a candidate? The Court's argument rests on the fallacious assumption that only direct contributions from corporations to candidates foster corruption, and that any independent expenditures—though they have the same effect as direct contributions—do not create such a problem. Proponents of the Court's decision would argue that even after this ruling, campaign finance law remains the same: you still can’t buy a vote.
But the fact of the matter remains: it's not necessary for a corporation to provide direct financial support to a candidate in order for corruption to exist. Out of necessity, the relationship between interest groups and political figures has evolved beyond that point: not only is it illegal for politicians to receive direct contributions from these groups, but it's also unpopular among the American public. Americans have always despised the idea that someone should receive privileged treatment as a result of anything but their own hard work, and the populist rage against the elite—the banks, the politicians, the executives—reflects this attitude. So business and government have had to adapt their relationship to the point where a vote can be bought without even a penny being exchanged. The fundamental flaw in the Court's ruling is its frightening misunderstanding of the nature of corruption in contemporary American politics.
DAVID ZOPPO
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